Enhancement and Civic Virtue by Jefferson, William et al.
Enhancement and Civic Virtue 
Will Jefferson, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford 
william.jefferson@philosophy.ox.ac.uk 
 
Thomas Douglas, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, 
thomas.douglas@philosophy.ox.ac.uk 
 
Guy Kahane, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, 
guy.kahane@philosophy.ox.ac.uk 
 
Julian Savulescu, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford 
julian.savulescu@philosophy.ox.ac.uk 
 
 
Abstract: 
Opponents of biomedical enhancement frequently adopt what Allen Buchanan has called the Personal 
Goods Assumption. On this assumption, the benefits of biomedical enhancement will accrue primarily to 
those individuals who undergo enhancements, not to wider society. Buchanan has argued that biomedical 
enhancements might in fact have substantial social benefits by increasing productivity. We outline 
another way in which enhancements might benefit wider society: by augmenting civic virtue and thus 
improving the functioning of our political communities. We thus directly confront critics of biomedical 
enhancement who argue that it will lead to a loss of social cohesion and a breakdown in political life. 
 
Keywords: 
Biomedical Enhancement 
Cognitive Enhancement 
Moral Enhancement 
Civic Virtue 
Allen Buchanan 
Personal Goods Assumption 
Social Cohesion 
 
Acknowledgements: 
We would like to thank three anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier versions of this 
manuscript. We thank the Wellcome Trust (grant numbers WT087211, 100705/Z/12/Z, WT087208MF 
and 086041/Z/08/Z) for their funding.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ENHANCEMENT AND THE ETHICS OF CITIZENSHIP 2 
 
Developments in biomedical science are giving rise to new techniques to enhance the physical, cognitive 
and even the affective capacities of human beings. The development and potential use of these 
techniques, which we shall refer to as biomedical enhancements,
1
 has generated considerable controversy. 
Whereas the use of medical interventions to treat the sick is widely regarded as ethically unproblematic in 
most cases, the prospective use of new technologies to enhance normal, healthy people has prompted a 
range of objections. 
Some of these objections appeal to the motives for which biomedical enhancement might be 
pursued. For example, Michael Sandel has written that “the deepest moral objection to enhancement lies 
… in the human disposition it expresses.” It “represent[s] the one-sided triumph of willfulness over 
giftedness, of dominion over reverence, of molding over beholding.”2 Others question the means by 
which biomedical enhancement is achieved, sometimes claiming that it amounts to a form of cheating,
3
 or 
holding that biomedical means to enhancement are problematic because they are unnatural, in the sense of 
being abnormal, artificial, or contrary to the natural moral law.
4
 However, perhaps the richest set of 
objections points out various negative consequences or implications of biomedical enhancement, either 
for the enhanced individual, or for others.
5
 It has been claimed, for example, that biomedical 
                                                          
1
 The distinction between treatment and enhancement is difficult to make precisely, and has itself been the subject of 
controversy. See, for discussion, Juengst, Eric, “Can Enhancement Be Distinguished from Prevention in Genetic 
Medicine?” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1997; 22(2): 125-42; Savulescu, Julian, “Justice, Fairness, and 
Enhancement,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 2006; 1093(1): 321-338, pp. 321-338; and Bostrom, 
Nick and Roache, Rebecca, “Ethical Issues in Human Enhancement,” in New Waves in Applied Ethics, ed. Jesper 
Ryberg, Thomas Petersen, and Clark Wolf (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
2
 Sandel, Michael, The Case Against Perfection. Cambridge, (MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 46, p. 85. 
3
 Gazzaniga, Michael S., The Ethical Brain (New York: Dana Press, 2005), p. 73; Rose, Steven, The Future of the 
Brain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 303. 
4
 Kass, Leon, “Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls,” New Atlantis 2003; 1: 9-28; President’s Council on Bioethics, Beyond 
Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness (Washington, DC: President's Council on Bioethics, 2003), 
pp. 209-3. 
5
 The concern has typically been with contingent, causal consequences of biomedical enhancement: authors have 
worried that that biomedical enhancements would contingently cause various negative effects. However, it is also 
possible that pursuit of biomedical enhancements could undermine basic goods in necessary and/or non-causal ways, 
for instance, by negating some constituent of the good. David Oderberg suggests that enhancements achieved 
through certain forms of artificial reproduction could undermine the goods of sex and human reproduction in this 
way. See his “Towards a Natural Law Critique of Genetic Engineering,” in Philosophical Reflections on Medical 
Ethics, ed. Nafsika Athanasoulis, 109–34 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), esp. pp. 122-123. 
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enhancements might alienate the enhanced individuals from their true or authentic selves,
6
 restrict the 
enhanced person’s freedom or autonomy,7 put unenhanced individuals at an unfair competitive 
disadvantage,
8
 extinguish or devalue the rights of unenhanced persons,
9
 undermine social solidarity,
10
 
poison or undermine healthy family and romantic relationships,
11
 or exacerbate existing unjust 
inequalities.
12
 These considerations have often been taken, either alone or in combination, to weigh 
decisively against all forms of biomedical enhancement. 
In recent work, Allen Buchanan has criticised the proponents of these concerns—and indeed of 
existing responses to them—for neglecting to consider the significant social benefits that biomedical 
enhancements might have. In his article “Enhancement and the Ethics of Development” and his books 
Beyond Humanity? and Better Than Human, Buchanan argues that biomedical enhancements may benefit 
society through increasing the productivity of the enhanced individual.
13
 The social benefits of 
productivity-increasing enhancements should be familiar to us, he suggests, because such enhancements 
have been used for millennia. On Buchanan’s view, the new biomedical enhancements under discussion 
are but a novel extension of a broad set of enhancement tools that includes education, agricultural 
techniques, and legal and political institutions. 
                                                          
6
 Elliott, Carl, Better than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream (New York: Norton, 2003); 
Glannon, Walter, Genes and Future People (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2003), pp. 81-2. 
7
 Habermas, Jurgen, The Future of Human Nature (Maldon, MA: Polity Press, 2003), esp. pp 64-90. 
8
 President’s Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy, pp. 131-7, 280-5; Sandel, The Case Against Perfection, pp. 18-
9. Relatedly, there have been concerns that a kind of ‘arms race’ will ensue, with individuals battling to out-enhance 
one another. See, for example, Fukuyama, Francis, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology 
Revolution (New York: Farrar, Staus and Giroux, 2002), pp. 9-10, 97; and McKibben, Bill. 2003.  Enough: Staying 
Human in an Engineered Age (New York: Times Books, 2003), pp. 33 – 40. 
9
 Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future, p.42; Wikler, Daniel I., “Paternalism in the Age of Cognitive Enhancement: 
Do Civil Liberties Presuppose Roughly Equal Mental Ability?” in Human Enhancement, ed. Julian Savulescu and 
Nick Bostrom, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 341-55. 
10
 President’s Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy, p.56; Sandel, The Case Against Perfection, pp. 89-91 
11
 President’s Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy, pp. 50-1, pp. 54-5; Sandel, The Case Against Perfection, pp. 
45-62, Oderberg, “Towards a Natural Law Critique of Genetic Engineering.” 
12
 Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future, pp. 9 – 10; President’s Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy, pp. 51-2, pp. 
281-3 
13
 Buchanan, Allen, “Enhancement and the Ethics of Development,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 2008; 18 
(1): 1-34; Buchanan, Allen, Beyond Humanity? The Ethics of Biomedical Enhancement (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011); Buchanan, Allen, Better Than Human: The Promise and Perils of Enhancing Ourselves (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). 
 ENHANCEMENT AND THE ETHICS OF CITIZENSHIP 4 
 
In section I, we outline Buchanan’s critique of existing discussions of the ethics of biomedical 
enhancement. In section II, we build upon his positive project of reframing the biomedical enhancement 
debate by arguing that widespread use of biomedical enhancements can be good for society in a second 
way – through contributing to civic virtue and thus improving the functioning of our political 
communities. The topic of civic virtue has received renewed attention over the last two decades both as 
part of a revival of republicanism in political philosophy
14
 and in response both to the challenges of 
multicultural politics and to concerns over low levels of civic and political engagement.
15
 In many 
countries, these problems of citizenship have been reflected in a renewed focus on ‘citizenship 
education.’16 We argue that some biomedical enhancements may help with these problems, and that this is 
an important consideration so far neglected in the debate. 
In making this argument, we seek to buttress Buchanan’s claim that the project of biomedical 
enhancement could have important social benefits. However, the character of the benefit we introduce is 
of particular force in the debate. In claiming that enhancements can improve the functioning of our 
political communities, we are tackling head on the critics of enhancement who claim the opposite.
17
 
Whereas such critics might reply to Buchanan that increased productivity is a minor concern relative to 
the threat of losing social cohesion and a breakdown in political life, such a reply cannot be made to our 
argument. Our point is precisely that some forms of biomedical enhancement, appropriately used, could 
play a key role in defending these values.  
In section III, we move on to consider two possible responses to our argument. Firstly, we 
consider whether there really is need for widespread increases in civic virtue amongst the citizens of 
modern liberal democracies. Secondly, we discuss whether unequal access to biomedical enhancements 
                                                          
14
 Dagger, R., Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism (Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 1- 
7. 
15
 Kymlicka, Will and Norman, Wayne, “Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts,” in 
Citizenship in Diverse Societies, ed. Norman Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 1-41, at pp. 5-
6. 
16
 For example, the UK introduced citizenship as a statutory subject in the secondary national curriculum in 2002. 
For a broad, though somewhat dated, survey of civic education in 16 countries, see Kerr, David, “Citizenship 
Education: an International Comparison,” International Review of Curriculum and Assessment Frameworks Internet 
Archive (1999).  
17
 See Gazzaniga, The Ethical Brain, p. 303.  
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might lead to the emergence of an elite social group that is virtuous in so far as it expertly engages in 
politics, but damaging to society in so far as it uses its political ‘virtues’ to serve its own interests. 
Following that, in section IV, we re-consider Sandel’s concerns, and discuss the net impact that 
biomedical enhancements might have on social solidarity. Finally, in section V, we briefly discuss the 
implications of our argument for existing critiques of biomedical enhancement and outline its possible 
relevance to positive arguments for it.  
 
I. RE-FRAMING THE ENHANCEMENT DEBATE 
 Buchanan claims that the debate about the ethics of biomedical enhancement has, to date, been 
guided by the following framing assumption  
Personal Goods Assumption: the most significant benefits [of biomedical enhancement] are 
private or personal goods, that is, advantages to the persons who are enhanced (or to their parents 
in the case of enhanced children).
18
  
Grounding this assumption, Buchanan suggests, are two further assumptions. Firstly, that enhancement 
will be a “zero sum affair,” in which any benefits an individual gains through undergoing enhancement 
are obtained through out-competing other individuals. Accordingly, those benefits—from beating a rival 
to a job, or winning a sports competition—are, from an impartial point of view, cancelled out by the 
losses incurred by the now-beaten individuals.
19
 Secondly, it has been assumed that use of enhancements 
will have deep negative impacts on society. As mentioned above, for example, it has been argued that use 
of enhancements may increase social divisions and erode social solidarity.
20
 
Buchanan argues that these assumptions have skewed the debate by diverting attention away from 
important social benefits that enhancements might have. In particular, he argues that “some enhancements 
will increase human productivity very broadly conceived and thereby create the potential for large-scale 
                                                          
18
 Buchanan, Beyond Humanity? p. 35. See also Buchanan, “Enhancement and the Ethics of Development,” p. 2. 
19
 For examples of this type of argument, see Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future and McKibben, Enough. 
20
 Sandel, The Case Against Perfection, pp. 89-91. We consider this argument in more detail in section IV below. 
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increases in human well-being.”21 We should, Buchanan concludes, re-frame the debate about biomedical 
enhancement by giving serious consideration to the social benefits that enhancements might have. 
In what follows we build upon Buchanan’s argument by highlighting a second type of social 
benefit that biomedical enhancements can have. Some biomedical enhancements, we argue, would 
promote civic virtue and thus help to improve the functioning of modern liberal democracies. To 
introduce this argument, it will be helpful to explain a methodological approach to the enhancement 
debate that we borrow from Buchanan. Buchanan sees the new biomedical enhancements as high-tech 
versions of long-established practices
22
 and argues that “for the most part the concerns about 
enhancement apply, not just across a wide variety of modes of biomedical enhancement, but to 
nonbiomedical enhancements as well.”23 Consequently it is natural for him to draw on literature 
discussing traditional practices to generate insight about how we should think about the new high-tech 
practices. In particular, he deploys insights from the ethics of development to the biomedical 
enhancement debates.
24
 
The foundation for his method might be made explicit in the following formulation: 
The Relevance Thesis: New biomedical enhancements are sufficiently similar to ‘traditional’ 
methods of enhancement to make ethical debates surrounding the second relevant to the first. 
Buchanan clearly accepts the Relevance Thesis when he contextualises bio-medical enhancements in a 
long tradition of enhancement techniques and highlights parallels between the two types of enhancement. 
In support of the Thesis, he argues that there is no fundamental or universal morally difference between 
biomedical enhancements and more traditional enhancements.
25
 In particular, both types of enhancement 
can, he notes, affect our internal states as well as the external environment, both can have irreversible 
effects, including genetic effects on future generations, both can lead to changes in what kinds of human 
                                                          
21
 Buchanan, “Enhancement and the Ethics of Development,” p. 2. For an explanation of Buchanan’s his notion of 
productivity, see p. 7: ‘Productivity in the broadest sense is how good we are at using existing resources to create 
things we value.’ 
22
 Buchanan, “Enhancement and the Ethics of Development,” pp. 4 – 7. 
23
 Buchanan, Beyond Humanity? p. 26. 
24
 Buchanan, “Enhancement and the Ethics of Development,” pp. 3 – 15. 
25
 See especially Buchanan, Beyond Humanity? pp. 39-44; Buchanan, Better Than Human, pp. 9-24. 
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capacities quality as normal, both could be regarded as ‘unnatural’ in similar ways, and both could be 
used in ways that produce distributive injustices.
26
 
The Relevance Thesis has enormous implications for the enhancement debate because it expands 
the relevant literature from the recent writings about biomedical enhancement to the huge and multi-
faceted literature on traditional methods of improving human capacities. Following Buchanan’s treatment 
of the ‘Ethics of Development,’ we might ask: what other bodies of work might have useful insight for 
contemporary biomedical enhancement debates?  In particular, given that we can view education as a 
powerful and pervasive form of traditional enhancement, we can ask: what social benefits have been 
attributed to education that might also apply to other enhancements? 
It is a widely held view that there are significant private gains to education—enhancing yourself 
by studying at school or university makes you better off. To some extent, this is simply because it allows 
you to outperform less enhanced individuals in the job market. If an extra qualification benefits me 
because it enables me to beat you in a job application, my gain is offset by the loss to the less enhanced 
individual who now loses out on the job. Yet it would seem implausible to suggest that there was no net 
social benefit from education. One of the reasons for this is that, in some sectors, giving workers more 
education increases their productivity, and this in turn tends to increase the productivity of those that they 
work with. It may also allow them to produce work that has broad social benefits, such as coming up with 
new medicines or technologies. There is another way in which education has social value. In public 
economics, for example, “it is widely believed that education is an essential component of a stable 
democratic society because it encourages citizens to participate in democratic processes and prepares 
them to do so in an informed and intelligent manner.”27 When considering new biomedical enhancement 
techniques, therefore, we should also ask: might they also have social value through promoting good 
citizenship?  
                                                          
26
 Buchanan, “Enhancement and the Ethics of Development,” p. 5. 
27
  Dee, Thomas, “Are there civic returns to education?” Journal of Public Economics 2004; 88:1698. 
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We now move to construct our argument that some biomedical enhancements could contribute to 
the development or realisation of civic virtues. This raises the question of what the civic virtues are. We 
then describe how certain forms of biomedical enhancement could contribute to the development or 
realisation of these virtues.  
 
II. CIVIC VIRTUE AND BIOMEDICAL ENHANCEMENT 
A. CIVIC VIRTUE 
Following Dagger,
28
 we will take a civic virtue to be a quality (ability, attitude or disposition) that is 
needed in order to perform one’s role as a citizen well. We take it also that one important role of the 
citizen is to contribute to the political functioning of her community. Thus, we assume, qualities of 
citizens which reliably contribute to the good functioning of a polity will qualify as civic virtues, and how 
well a political community functions will depend substantially on the degree to which its citizens possess 
those virtues.
29
  
We do not intend to provide a comprehensive inventory of civic virtues or to exhaustively survey 
the immense literature on this topic.
30
 Rather, we aim to identify a small number of core civic virtues that 
we think biomedical enhancements might help develop. We do this by summarising recent discussions 
which highlight concerns about the levels of civic virtue in modern liberal democracies. Firstly, we look 
at the question of whether citizens have sufficient tolerance and solidarity towards one another to secure 
social cohesion in multicultural societies. Secondly, we briefly examine the phenomenon of ‘political 
disengagement’ amongst modern electorates.  
 
 
 
                                                          
28
 Dagger, Civic Virtue.  
29
 Audi, Robert, “A Liberal Theory of Civic Virtue,” Social Philosophy and Policy 2009; 15(1): 149-170, at p. 149. 
30
 For an example of such an inventory, see Galston, William, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in 
the Liberal State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 221-225.  
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i. Social Cohesion 
Broadly speaking, the level of social cohesion of a political community is the extent to which its 
members identify with one another. Social cohesion gives rise to trust and makes citizens more willing to 
co-operate with one another, making it easier to solve collective action problems, and to maintain law and 
order. There have been two kinds of concern about whether there is enough social cohesion in modern 
liberal democracies.  
In the first place, the presence of diverse cultural and ethnic groups within modern states may 
make it harder to maintain social cohesion. According to Kymlicka and Norman, fractious debates over 
multiculturalism have been a key driver behind the resurgence of interest in citizenship amongst political 
theorists.
31
  These debates typically operate from the starting assumption that society requires a certain 
amount of social cohesion between its citizens in order to operate, and proceed to ask questions such as 
whether granting special rights and privileges to minority groups would undermine (or promote) this 
cohesion. A related issue is that of whether—in order to secure the requisite cohesion—citizens need to 
endorse a kind of ‘Liberal Nationalism.’32  
For Kymlicka and Norman, these issues emphasise the importance of citizens having one virtue 
in particular—a willingness to engage in public discourse—even with individuals they might strongly 
disagree with (the corollary of this is that the citizen restrains from coercive or manipulative responses to 
conflict).
33
 This highlights the importance of related virtues such as having feelings of solidarity towards 
one’s fellow citizens, as well as not holding prejudices towards other groups.  
Public engagement should ideally be tolerant, respectful rational dialogue.
34
 It involves respecting 
others with different values and being open minded. The hallmark of a liberal society is its ability to form 
and revise policy, and individual opinion, in the light of reason and evidence.
35
  
                                                          
31
 Kymlicka and Norman, “Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies,” pp. 5 - 6. 
32
 Miller, David, Citizenship and National Identity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). 
33
 Kymlicka and Norman, “Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies,” p. 8. 
34
 See, for an elucidation of this idea, Rawls, John, “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics.” Philosophical 
Review 1951; 60(3), 177–97. 
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Tolerance also involves toleration of difference, including difference one chooses not to correct. 
A liberal society should offer opportunity, not enforce outcome. Concerns about social solidarity are 
justified if we are talking only about cognitive enhancement but we are considering a much broader range 
of virtues promoting liberal citizenry. 
A second type of concern is that declining participation in traditional forms of community life 
might inhibit the maintenance of social cohesion.  In 1995, Robert Putnam published a controversial 
article collating empirical research on the decline of ‘social capital’ in the US.36 Comparing modern levels 
with those of the 1960s, participation in formal organizations like churches, labour unions, parent-teacher 
associations, sports groups etc. had dropped drastically – by up to 50% in many cases. Combined with the 
well-documented trend towards the break-up of family structures, and reduced trust in neighbourhood 
communities, this led Putnam to a shocking conclusion: American civil society, once viewed as a shining 
example of good practice, was in crisis. These trends appear to be replicated in many other established 
democracies (though perhaps not all).
37
  
There are then, powerful worries about the level of social cohesion in modern liberal 
democracies. These worries suggest the importance of several inter-related civic virtues: attitudes of 
solidarity with other citizens, freedom from prejudice, willingness to participate in community life, and 
willingness to engage in public discourse.  
 
ii. Political disengagement 
A second reason for the renewed interest in citizenship has been concern over levels of ‘voter 
apathy’. While it is easy to exaggerate the concern, data suggest that in most major established 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
35
 The promotion of openness and responsiveness to reason and evidence as a part of civic enhancement would also 
reduce the effects of various cognitive biases which might otherwise operate if cognitive enhancement alone were 
employed. We return to this issue in note 50. 
36
 Putnam, Robert D., “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” Journal of Democracy 1995; 6(1): 65-
75. For an explanation of social capital, see p.67: “Social capital’ refers to features of social organization such as 
networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.” 
37
 For a survey, see Halpern, David, The Hidden Wealth of Nations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009). 
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democracies, there have been declines in voter turnout for the major national elections since 1950.
38
 
Membership of political parties has dropped off even more rapidly,
39
 and taken together, these statistics 
could be taken to indicate that electorates have become increasingly disengaged with politics.  
This conclusion, however, may be too strong. It may be that citizens are participating in politics 
via other means, perhaps through lobbying groups, direct action campaigns or protests. A more direct 
indicator of ‘political engagement’ is the level of knowledge about politics that the average citizen has. 
And here the consensus is (at least in the US) that “popular levels of information about public affairs are, 
from the point of view of an informed observer, astonishingly low.”40 The ‘information’ discussed here is 
information about political structures, candidates in elections, and their policy manifestos. Numerous 
surveys have been done showing that while citizens can recall trivial facts about politicians (pet names 
etc.) they often fail to know basic things about their policy packages.
41
 Indeed, academics have struggled 
to explain how democracy works at all, given that it places decision-making power with such poorly 
informed electorates.
42
 
Many thinkers have sought to explain this ‘paradox’ with theories that show how democracy can 
function with a minimally informed average citizen.
43
 Firstly, it has been argued that citizens employ 
heuristics which allow them to make political judgments with very little information. Secondly, it has 
been suggested that democracy only requires a small subset of informed citizens to play a watchdog role 
                                                          
38
 In a survey of eighteen advanced mass democracies, Mark Gray and Miki Caul find that turn-out had dropped an 
average of 10% points between 1950 and 1997. See their “Declining Voter Turnout in Advanced Industrial 
Democracies, 1950-1997: The effects of Declining Group Mobilization,” Comparative Political Studies 2000; 33: 
1091-1122. 
39
 For a summary of falling party membership in European Democracies, see Mair, Peter and van Biezen, Ingrid. 
“Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980-2000,” Party Politics 2001; 7(1): 5-21). Putnam 
(“Bowling Alone,” p. 68) summarizes similar declines in the number of Americans working for a political party. 
40
 Converse, Philip, “Public Opinion and Voting Behavior,” in Handbook of Political Science, ed. Fred Greenstein 
and Nelson Polsby (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975). For more recent arguments to similar effect, see also 
Caplan, Brian, The Myth of the Rational Voter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); and Brennan, Jason, 
The Ethics of Voting (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 5. 
41
 For a summary of relevant research, see Carpini, Michael X. Delli, “In Search of the Informed Citizen: What 
Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters.” The Communication Review 1999; 4(1): 129-164. It should be 
noted that Carpini also discusses evidence that citizens from other states may be better informed, but only slightly 
better informed. See pp. 138-140. 
42
 Carpini, “In Search of the Informed Citizen”. 
43
 Carpini, “In Search of the Informed Citizen,” pp. 143-52. 
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over expert governors. Thirdly, it has been claimed that collective public opinion can be rational, even if 
the individual opinions underlying it are not, if, for example, individual errors are randomly distributed 
and cancel each other out when aggregated together.  
Although these arguments may go some way towards explaining how democracy functions with 
an apparently ill informed electorate, they do not hide the fact that electorates don’t know much, and that 
it would be better if they knew more. Indeed, all of these theories concede, or imply, that increasing the 
knowledgeability of the electorate would increase the quality of their judgements, and thus of democratic 
outcomes. Thus, after considering these issues, Carpini concludes, “While it is impossible to identify the 
specific pieces of information necessary for assuring good citizenship within this context, clearly some 
information is important, and all other things being equal, more information is better than less 
information.”44 
 
iii. Summary: Cognitive and moral components of good citizenship  
From the preceding discussion, we can identify two (inter-related) groups of civic virtues. Firstly, 
there are cognitive virtues. Democracies function more effectively when citizens have political 
knowledge—of electoral candidates, their policies and of information relevant to evaluating those 
policies—and the cognitive skills that help them acquire, maintain and apply that knowledge. Secondly, 
there is an affective and motivational, aspect to civic virtue. It is important to have citizens who are 
motivated to vote, learn about politics, and to participate in community life, as well as endorsing 
democratic norms such as tolerance, and feeling a sense of solidarity towards their fellow citizens. 
Importantly they should engage in open rational dialogue, respecting others with different values and 
being prepared to revise their own moral views in the light of reasons and evidence. 
This account helps clarify how biomedical enhancements could promote civic virtue. The 
cognitive aspects of civic virtue can be promoted through formal and informal education, and biomedical 
cognitive enhancements could be used to augment and accelerate that education. Moreover, there is 
                                                          
44
 Carpini, “In Search of the Informed Citizen,” p. 153. 
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evidence to suggest that promoting the cognitive aspects of civic virtue has positive knock-on effects on 
the affective, or motivational, aspects of good citizenship.
45
 Finally, it may also be possible to develop 
biomedical enhancements which directly develop the conative and affective aspects of civic virtue. We 
now elaborate on these points in more detail.  
 
B. CIVIC BENEFITS OF COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENTS 
 In this section, we outline how cognitive enhancements might contribute to the development of 
civic virtues. To begin, we summarise a range of biomedical enhancement techniques that are either 
available now, or likely to be developed in the future. We then discuss how such biomedical 
enhancements might—in conjunction with education—contribute to civic virtue.  
 
i. Bio-medical Cognitive Enhancements 
The science of cognitive enhancement is in its infancy but there is some evidence that a range of 
currently available drugs can, under laboratory conditions, augment performance on certain cognitive 
tasks, including tests of concentration, working memory and executive function. The most commonly 
used of these drugs is caffeine. Other drugs for which there is some evidence of cognitive enhancing 
effects and which have been used for purposes of cognitive enhancement include Ritalin 
(methylphenidate), Aderall (an amphetamine salt), and Provigil (modafinil).
46
 Though the effects of these 
drugs outside of laboratory contexts are not well understood, their cognitive enhancing effects under 
                                                          
45
 See, for example, Hodson, Gordon and Busseri, Michael, “Bright Minds and Dark Attitudes: Lower Cognitive 
Ability Predicts Greater Prejudice through Right-Wing Ideology and Low Intergroup Contact,” Psychological 
Science 2012; 23(2): 187-195. 
46
 Teter, Christian J., et al., “Prevalence and Motivations for the Illicit Use of Prescription Stimulants in an 
Undergraduate Student Sample,” Journal of American College Health 2005; 53(6): 253-262; McCabe, Sean 
Ebestan, et al., “Medical Use, Illicit Use and Diversion of Prescription Stimulant Medication,” Journal of 
Psychoactive Drugs 2006; 38(1): 43-56; DeSantis, Alan D. And Hane, Audrey Curtis, “’Adderall is Definitely Not a 
Drug’: Justifications for the Illegal Use of ADHD Stimulants,” Substance Use & Misuse 2010; 45(1-2):31-46. 
46
 Other cognitive enhancing drugs that may enter widespread use in the future include the anticholinesterase 
inhibitor donepezil (Aricept), the selective noradrenaline reuptake inhibitor atomoxetine (Strattera), and the α2 
adrenergic agonist guanfacine (Tanex). See, for discussion, De Jongh, Reinould et al., “Botox for the Brain: 
Enhancement of Cognition, Mood and Pro-social Behavior and Blunting of Unwanted Memories,” Neuroscience & 
Biobehavioral Reviews 2008; 32(4): 760-776. 
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laboratory conditions make it reasonable to suppose that they may have cognitive enhancing effects in 
other contexts as well. Moreover, even if these drugs would not have cognitive-enhancing effects outside 
the laboratory, their laboratory effects make it plausible that future versions of these drugs or other drugs 
(possibly initially developed to reverse cognitive impairment such as memory impairment in Alzheimer’s 
Disease) will be more effective enhancers, and will have fewer side effects. 
Non-invasive brain stimulation such as transcranial electrical stimulation (TES) and transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS), especially in combination with behavioral training, offer potential non-
pharmaceutical alternatives for cognitive enhancement. For example, Transcranial Direct Current 
Stimulation has already been shown to be effective at improving mathematical ability in children with 
low numeracy skills under laboratory conditions.
47
 Again, even if these results turn out not to generalise 
outside the laboratory, they make plausible the suggestion that future brain stimulation technologies 
might have significant cognitive enhancing effects in non-laboratory use, at least when coupled with 
appropriate training.   
We do not wish to make any bold claims regarding the likely availability and effectiveness of 
biomedical cognitive enhancers in the future. We assume only that the likelihood that we will have 
effective biomedical cognitive enhancers in the short-to-medium term future is sufficient that the ethical 
considerations bearing on their use warrant discussion now. This empirical assumption seems to us 
plausible, and it is of course endorsed by most authors on both sides of the ethical debate over biomedical 
enhancement, though it has been disputed.
48
  
We now argue that one important benefit of biomedical cognitive enhancers may be to contribute 
to the development or realisation of cognitive virtues.  
 
ii. How cognitive enhancements could contribute to civic virtue 
                                                          
47
 Cohen Kadosh, Roi, et al., “Modulating neuronal activity produces specific and long lasting changes in numerical 
competence,” Current Biology 2010; 20: 2016-2020. 
48
 See, for example, Rosoff, Philip, “The Myth of Genetic Enhancement,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 2012; 
33:163–178. 
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The most obvious way in which cognitive enhancements could contribute to civic virtue is by 
facilitating the process of acquiring and applying political knowledge. In the first place, we suggest, 
cognitively enhanced individuals would learn more from existing programs specifically aiming to teach 
‘good citizenship'. Such programs teach students about how political institutions work, or about local 
political issues, or about political values. 
But civic education does not just take place in civic education classes. Rather, the whole system 
of formal primary, secondary and tertiary education can be seen as a tool for promoting good citizenship. 
Promoting citizenship is not the only important benefit of such education—it also prepares young people 
for the workforce, and gives them skills necessary to lead an autonomous life—but it is an important one. 
To see this, note that basic literacy and numeracy skills are a pre-requisite for many of the civic virtues 
discussed above. Unless you can read, and work with numbers, it would be very hard to make informed 
voting decisions. In addition, subjects like history and literature develop critical thinking skills that can be 
applied to politics. Learning science and social science helps you understand policy debates. And it 
cannot be ruled out at this stage that this kind of educational effort could be improved or facilitated using 
biomedical means. 
At present, many education systems are instilling these skills only in a proportion of students. For 
example, it is estimated that one needs an IQ or around 90 to complete a US tax return, meaning that more 
than 20% of the adult population is unable to do so.
49
 Widespread biomedical enhancements of learning 
ability which amplified the effects of basic education could be expected to increase the proportion of 
individuals who develop the literacy, numeracy, critical thinking skills and subject-specific knowledge 
required for effective political participation. 
Note that the benefits of cognitive enhancement for effective citizenship need not be limited to 
the formal education of younger individuals. During our adult lives, we are continually learning about 
politics through our exposure to media such as newspapers, the internet and television. If cognitively 
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enhanced individuals could acquire more of this information faster, then they would be more politically 
knowledgeable than they otherwise would, and would thus be better citizens.
50
  
Of course, political knowledge and other cognitive elements of civic virtue may not, by 
themselves, amount to much. It would not be much use to have citizens who are well informed but lack 
the motivation to vote, or who vote on the basis of anti-democratic values. Accordingly, we now turn to 
examine empirical evidence which suggests that better-informed citizens also tend to be better citizens in 
a broader sense. 
 
iii. Empirical Evidence 
Attempting to summarise the relevant literature on this matter, Carpini argues that the balance of 
evidence supports the view that more informed citizens are ‘better’ citizens, in a broad sense: 
 
Specifically, research has found that more-informed citizens are more accepting of democratic 
norms such as political tolerance, are more efficacious about politics, are more likely to be 
interested in, follow and discuss politics, and are more likely to participate in politics in a variety 
of ways, including voting, working for a political party, and attending local community 
meetings.
51
 
 
                                                          
50
 The ability to engage in political debate in a rational, effective as well as civil manner is affected not only by 
one’s general cognitive capacities, but also by one’s ability to overcome various biases. One pertinent example is 
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one’s biases and prejudices (for discussion, see Stanovich, K. E., West, R. F., Toplak, M. E. ‘Myside Bias, Rational 
Thinking, and Intelligence’. Current Directions in Psychological Science 22 (4): 259–264). Education (of the kind, 
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There is also evidence to suggest a strong correlation between educational attainment and good 
citizenship. For example, the OECD concludes that “people with more schooling are likely to make more 
informed choices when voting and to participate more actively in their communities.”52 Such data support 
our argument, on the assumption that increasing an individual’s cognitive ability increases the chance that 
they will stay in education longer, or allows them to achieve educational outcomes typically associated 
with longer periods of education in the same period.  
Other suggestive evidence linking cognitive ability of electorates to positive political outcomes is 
provided by McDaniel, who has analysed data on individual states in the US and reports ‘preliminary’ 
findings that having higher average population IQ is correlated with having less violent crime, and more 
effective governance.
53
 
An obvious challenge to these points is that the cited correlations between education and civic 
virtue do not alone show that the former causes the latter. One might wonder whether the causation runs 
‘backward’ (being a better citizen makes one more likely to undertake more education and learn more 
about politics), or whether there are third variables (such as coming from a politically engaged family) 
which cause individuals to be better educated in general, better informed about politics and a better 
citizen broadly considered. There are, however, several studies which have attempted to address these 
concerns, and which suggest that increased education causally contributes to civic virtue. For example, on 
the basis of an international study spanning the second half of the twentieth century, Rindermann 
concludes that: “Education and cognitive abilities have a positive impact on all analysed political 
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outcomes including democracy, rule of law, and political freedom.”54 If education does indeed have a 
positive influence on the development of civic virtue (and not merely its cognitive elements), then it is 
plausible that at least some biomedical enhancements that enhance education will also have a positive 
influence: namely, those which (i) enhance learning ability and thus generally amplify the effects of 
education, and (ii) are used in conjunction with education.  
 
B. CIVIC BENEFITS OF MORAL ENHANCEMENTS 
Having considered how cognitive enhancements might be used to promote good citizenship, we 
now consider the role for ‘moral’ enhancements. The idea of morally enhancing ourselves is one of the 
more recent additions to the debate about biomedical enhancement debates. For example it has been 
argued that, at least in some circumstances, we would have reasons to undergo enhancements that would 
alter our conative or affective states so as to make them more conducive to morally good motivation or 
conduct.
55
 It has been suggested that such enhancements might operate by, for example, influencing 
dispositions towards aggression, racial prejudice and sympathy.  
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Decision Making,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2005; 19(4): 25-42). 
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Applied Philosophy 2008; 25 (3): 228-245; Douglas, T., “Moral Enhancement via Direct Emotion Modulation: A 
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Such biomedical moral enhancements are likely to be more controversial than the kinds of 
biomedical cognitive enhancement discussed earlier.
56
 Our purpose here is not to provide an all-things-
considered argument in favour of them, but to point out one valuable outcome that they might produce: 
they may, through contributing to civic virtue, help to secure the good functioning of our political 
institutions and processes. One way they could do this is by facilitating the dispositions towards 
cooperativeness and trust that plausibly underpin social solidarity.  
It might be thought that this discussion of moral enhancements is irrelevant, because we currently 
lack any means of bringing about such enhancements. However, recent years have seen dramatic 
advances in the scientific understanding of the neural bases of our moral capacities. The study of 
pharmacological influences on moral decision-making is an increasingly active area of research and 
several recent studies have already reported that psychopharmacological interventions can increase trust 
and cooperation in economic games, reduce people’s willingness to directly harm others, and diminish 
violent re-offending.
57
 Though we are currently very far from having even minimally reliable means of 
facilitating conative and affective bases social cohesion, it is reasonable to take seriously the possibility 
that we might have such interventions in the future. Moreover, there are other kinds of intervention which 
might be used. For example, ‘neurofeedback’ techniques in which individuals engage in emotional 
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training tasks while being provided with real-time feedback on neural activity have already been shown to 
allow the rapid alteration of emotional responses in laboratory settings.
58
  
 
C. INTERIM CONCLUSION 
Our main focus in this section has been to argue that certain kinds of cognitive enhancements 
may have an important social benefit in so far as they contribute to the development of civic virtues.
59
 In 
some cases, these interventions might be used with the purpose of enhancing civic virtue. But even where 
individuals biomedically enhance themselves or their children with purely self-interested aims in mind, 
their efforts might lead, as a side effect, to the development of civic virtues. For example, parents might 
provide learning ability enhancements to their children solely with the aim of improving their children’s 
career prospects. However, insofar as those enhancements generally amplify the effects of basic 
education, they might be expected, in some cases, to contribute to the cognitive bases of civic virtue. In 
individuals who already possess the conative and affective bases of civic virtue, such enhancements could 
be expected to contribute to the development of the civic virtues themselves. Moreover, there is some 
evidence from studies of education suggesting that such uses of enhancement might also indirectly foster 
the conative and affective aspects of civic virtue. Finally, we have also tentatively suggested, drawing on 
recent literature on moral enhancement, that it may be possible to more directly biomedically enhance the 
conative and affective bases of moral motivation and conduct in ways which would increase civic virtue. 
Taken together, these considerations suggest that biomedical enhancements could have important 
social benefits through contributing to civic virtue. This consideration has been neglected in the 
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biomedical enhancement debates and strengthens Buchanan’s critique of the assumption that “the most 
significant benefits [of biomedical enhancements will be] private or personal goods, that is, advantages to 
the persons who are enhanced (or to their parents).” 
Having laid out our core argument, we now consider several possible responses to it.  
 
III. RESPONSES 
 We suspect that two main kinds of response will be made to our claims. First, one might accept 
that biomedical enhancements could contribute to civic virtue but deny that there would be any significant 
value in this outcome. Secondly, one might tackle our argument head-on, denying that there are, or will 
be in the near future, any biomedical enhancements that would promote civic virtue in the ways we 
suggest.  
An argument of the second kind might appeal to the observation that some of the possible 
cognitive enhancers that we mention above—especially methylphenidate—have already been in use for a 
number of decades, yet they do not appear to have given rise to any increase in civic virtue. Indeed, their 
use has coincided with a putative decline in civic virtue.
60
 This observation is, we think, consistent with 
our claim that future biomedical enhancers would plausibly be capable of increasing civic virtue.  
First, though methylphenidate and a number of other drugs have elicited cognitive-enhancing 
effects in laboratory settings, it may be that these effects do not generalise outside of laboratory settings, 
or at least, not to settings in which methylphenidate has been used outside the laboratory to date. Thus, we 
would not expect to have seen any beneficial effects on civic virtue. Nevertheless, as noted above, the fact 
that these agents have had cognitive-enhancing effects in the laboratory helps to make plausible the 
suggestion that future variants on these agents—or other drugs—would have more robust cognitive 
enhancing effects.  
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Second, even if existing stimulant drugs have had significant cognitive-enhancing effects outside 
the laboratory, we should not expect this to have produced a positive effect on civic virtue. This is 
primarily because these drugs have not been used in ways that would plausibly produce such an effect, 
which is unsurprising since it is only recently that their civic-related value has been studied. They have 
been used for a narrow range of purposes, primarily behavioural improvement of children with ADHD. 
They have not, for example, been used in conjunction with intensive civic education programmes. It may 
be, then, that these drugs have enhanced some cognitive components of civic virtue, but in circumstances 
where other cognitive, conative of affective components are absent. If the missing components are 
necessary for the realisation of civic virtue, then we would not expect the use of these drugs to have 
increased civic virtue.   
Third, it is in fact quite possible that use of methylphenidate and other stimulant drugs have had a 
positive impact on civic virtue, but this has been outweighed by countervailing negative influences, 
perhaps social influences of the sort discussed by Putnam.
61
 
 Let us return, then, to the first kind of objection, which accepts that biomedical enhancements 
could contribute to civic virtue but denies that there would be any significant value in this outcome. We 
suggest that it is unlikely that a critic would want to claim that civic virtues under discussion were not 
important at all. Yet one might plausibly argue that there is already enough civic virtue in modern liberal 
democracies and thus that there was no significant benefit to increasing it. Alternatively, one might argue 
that although more civic virtue, equally distributed, would be better, this is not the scenario that is likely 
to obtain. Rather, it may be that elites monopolise the use of biomedical enhancements and that the 
resulting unequal distribution of civic virtue (if you could still call it that), would not be a good thing. We 
now respond to these objections in turn.  
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A. DO WE NEED MORE CIVIC VIRTUE? 
A more developed version of the objection outlined above might run as follows. Civic virtue is 
valuable only insofar as it helps to maintain social cohesion and facilitate good democratic decision-
making, thus, if we have enough civic virtue to maintain these things, there would be no value in 
acquiring greater civic virtue. And when we look at modern liberal democracies, the objection would 
continue, it appears that we do have enough civic virtue to maintain social cohesion and good democratic 
decision-making: there is no evidence of political crisis. Our communities are not at risk of falling apart, 
and our democracies are healthy. Consequently, there is no need for improved civic virtue. 
We offer three replies to this argument. First, in the context of the literature cited above 
expressing deep worries about the health of both our civic and political life, it would be a bold claim to 
assert that our polities are well functioning. Second, the concept of a well functioning state is not a 
threshold concept. Thus, even if our states are functioning well, they could function better, and increases 
in civic virtue would make them do so. Moreover, it is implausible to suggest that there would be no 
value in such an improvement in political functioning. Political functioning does not lose all value above 
some threshold. Third, even if everything has been going well until now, there is reason to increase civic 
virtue to ensure that our states are capable of dealing with future challenges.
62
 Economic shocks, 
environmental disasters or dramatic technological developments may threaten social cohesion, and new 
policy challenges may emerge that expose the frailties in democratic processes. This last point in 
particular is worth expanding upon.  
Our general claim here is that the development of technology gives rise to new policy challenges 
that are both important and difficult to solve. A contemporary example of such a challenge is provided by 
the debate on climate change and carbon emissions reduction. Getting policy in this area right is 
immensely important. If the predictions of ‘pessimistic’ scientists are correct and we are heading towards 
catastrophe if we continue with business as usual, then failing to significantly cut emissions now is to put 
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the future of humanity in jeopardy. On the other hand, if fears about climate change are over-blown, then 
making big cuts to emissions inflicts a large and unnecessary cost on all of us. 
At the same time, challenges like these place huge cognitive demands on electorates. The science 
is hard to understand, and involves the aggregation of huge amounts of data. Moreover, decisions here 
involve weighing risks, and considering trade-offs between present costs and far-off benefits. Given that 
all of this creates problems for the experts, it is not surprising that it would be challenging for the average 
citizen who lacks the time and specialised training to gain a detailed understanding of these issues. Yet if 
citizens do not understand the rationale behind climate change policy, how can they be expected to offer 
support to politicians seeking to make policy choices that involve sacrifices now in order to reduce the 
risk of climate deterioration later, far into the future? 
63
 
There is a wealth of similarly challenging policy decisions that we already face, such as the 
prevention of terrorist attacks, including attacks using nuclear or biological weapons, policy regarding the 
use of nuclear weapons, policy on nuclear power stations, the regulation of global financial markets, and 
oversight of the internet. Looking further into the future, we might add to that list the regulation of 
potentially dangerous new technologies – such as artificial intelligence technology and nanotechnology.64 
In each of these cases, there is a potential for very bad outcomes to materialise if policy is made poorly 
and there is also ample reason to think that our societies are ill suited to make good policy in these areas.
65
 
 In order to prepare our democracies for the policy-making challenges of the future, therefore, we 
suggest that it would be helpful to increase levels of civic virtue.  At this point, a critic might reply that 
what is required is not to enhance the average citizen, but to enhance our rulers. If what we are really 
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worried about is challenging policy decisions, then why not just enhance the leaders that are actually 
making those decisions on a day-to-day basis? 
 The suggestion of enhancing political leaders is an interesting one. Political leadership is certainly 
cognitively demanding,
66
 and there is obviously a precedent of using education to improve the knowledge 
and cognitive capabilities of such leaders. This would naturally lead one to wonder whether there was a 
role for biomedical enhancements to obtain further improvements. However, we suggest that only 
enhancing political leaders is unlikely to solve our problems. In the first place, you would need a way of 
ensuring that the enhanced individuals actually got elected, and there is evidence to suggest that 
electorates may be put off candidates that are more than about 20 IQ points more intelligent than them,
67
 
implying that increases in electorate intelligence would be required to ensure a cognitively enhanced got 
elected. Moreover, once in office, it would be up to the electorate to play a watchdog role in ensuring that 
the cognitively enhanced leader did not become corrupt, and this watchdog role is itself likely to be 
cognitively demanding. Finally, even if enhancing political leaders would solve the policy-making 
problem, promoting civic virtue amongst the broader population would still be required to meet worries 
about social cohesion.  
 An alternative response to our argument above would hold that cognitive enhancements are self-
defeating as a means to better functioning polities. Suppose that the use of cognitive enhancements 
becomes widespread, raising ability levels significantly. For a given set of policy problems, citizens will 
be better placed to understand them. But, because scientists are now smarter, and technological progress 
accelerates, the widespread use of enhancement would create new, more complex policy challenges. 
Citizens would still struggle to keep pace with the latest policy challenges.  
In response, note first that this objection only applies to one aspect of our case for cognitive 
enhancements. Even if, on balance, such enhancements did not improve the ability of citizens to evaluate 
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policy decisions, they would still have benefits by improving the other aspects of civic virtue discussed 
above. Secondly, we should distinguish between the use of cognitive enhancements by scientists, and the 
use of such enhancements by the population at large. Our core argument is that the latter use would have 
important civic benefits. It may be that widespread use of cognitive enhancements inevitably also means 
use by those involved in science. But whether that is a problem or not depends on the trade-off between 
the benefits of scientific progress and the threat of creating dangerous new technologies that democracies 
struggle to regulate.  One thing is clear: if science is to continue with the aid of cognitive enhancements, 
then there will be good reasons for widespread use of such enhancements to enable electorates to ‘keep 
up’ with the complex questions raised by new technologies.  
 
B.  PROBLEMS OF UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION 
In the previous section, we argued for the importance of widespread increases in civic virtue in 
modern liberal democracies. We now turn to respond to the possibility that this scenario, though 
beneficial, would not obtain, and that instead only certain elite groups in society would access the 
biomedical enhancements under discussion. This, the worry continues, may be problematic. Suppose that 
one group in society undergoes powerful cognitive enhancements, and thus becomes much more 
knowledgeable about politics. That group might then be better at persuading or manipulating others, 
deploying their knowledge of ‘how politics works’ to better direct their lobbying efforts.  Might this 
group not therefore become adept at manipulating political outcomes in their favour? And thus, although 
that group would gain, might there be no net social gain? 
 There are two initial problems with this objection. In the first place, it could be undermined by a 
policy to ensure that there was a balanced distribution of the relevant enhancements amongst the 
population.
68
 Secondly, it ignores the link between the cognitive and affective aspects of civic virtue 
discussed above. If smarter, more politically informed citizens are also more co-operative and more 
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see Buchanan, Beyond Humanity? ch. 8. 
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tolerant of diversity, then it is implausible to suppose that there is no net social benefit to enhancements, 
even if they are limited to one group.  
We also find it implausible that there is no social benefit to increasing the political knowledge 
and cognitive skills of one group of citizens. To see this, consider an example in which every group of 
citizens was enhanced in this regard. If the benefits of enhancement were purely competitive—with 
private benefits offset by public costs—then no-one would be made better off by this increase in civic 
virtue. Every group would be better at competing to have their interests reflected in policy, but because 
the enhancements were equally distributed, then the outcome would still be the same and no group would 
be better off. Yet this seems implausible—it is reasonable to suppose that a state with a better-informed 
citizenry would be better managed.
69
 This suggests that there are social benefits from increasing the 
political literacy of at least some groups of citizens. It is true that there may also be ‘private’ benefit, 
taken at the expense of other groups (that is, imposing a social cost), but this is compatible with there also 
being a social benefit, including one that, in some cases, exceeds the social cost. It is also true that some 
social benefits from increasing the political literacy of a group of citizens may be conditional on all other 
groups having increased political literacy as well, for example, because the benefits flow would flow from 
the development of a broad-based consensus between politically well-informed citizens. But it is plausible 
that, in some cases, increasing the political literacy of a subset of citizens will have social benefits that are 
not conditional in this way; they would flow directly from the increased political literacy of the group in 
question and would obtain regardless of whether others also have increased literacy. One reason for there 
being a social benefit of this sort is that the interests of different groups will often overlap. Thus, if one 
group campaigns to protect its interests, it will often also help to protect the interests of others. For 
example, if one group advocates improved macro-economic management, or more prudent environmental 
management policy, they may advance their own interests, but in doing so benefit everyone (or at least a 
large majority). 
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 One might also consider what would happen if you made all groups less informed. Presumably this would be 
harmful to the state, implying that there is a social benefit from each citizen being political informed. 
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IV. SANDEL AND THE NET IMPACT OF BIOMEDICAL ENHANCEMENT ON SOLIDARITY 
We have been arguing that biomedical enhancements could contribute to civic virtue and that this 
could be expected to lead to better functioning polities and to improved social solidarity. In arguing that 
the use of enhancements might lead to increases in social solidarity, we are directly contradicting a claim 
to the opposite effect made by Sandel, to which we now turn.  
Sandel has argued that the use of biomedical enhancements will lead to a break down in 
sympathy between successful and unsuccessful individuals, thus eroding social solidarity and 
undermining support for the welfare state.
70
 This is because the successful will no longer regard the 
unsuccessful as having ‘unfortunate’ shortfalls in ability levels. Rather, they will see ability levels as an 
endogenous factor, subject to the control of enhancement technologies. To put it crudely, the successful 
might say to the unsuccessful:  it is your fault if you lack the abilities to succeed in life, because you could 
have enhanced yourself, so I am not paying for your failures.  
Several authors have criticized this argument.
71
 The main problem is that it is not clear why 
successful individuals would think that each individual was responsible for the ways in which he was and 
was not enhanced. Might some individuals simply not be able to afford enhancements? Moreover, Sandel 
focuses on genetic enhancements brought about through reproductive selection (that is, by the use of 
genetic testing by an individual’s parents), and it seems implausible to suggest I would be in any way 
responsible for an enhancement (or lack of enhancement) to my genes through this mechanism.
72
 To this, 
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 See Lev, Ori, “Will Biomedical Enhancements Undermine Solidarity, Responsibility, Equality and Autonomy?” 
Bioethics 2011; 25 (4): 177-184 and McConnell, Terrance, “Genetic Enhancement and Moral Attitudes Towards the 
Given,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2011; 28 (4): 372-373. 
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 An interesting complication is raised by the possibility that some individuals would voluntarily decide not to take 
available biomedical enhancements, despite these being readily available to them. Since these individuals would be 
responsible for their unenhanced state, might this reduce solidarity with them from the side of the enhanced? This is 
again an empirical question. We have earlier emphasized that civic education should promote tolerance for 
difference, and this should extend to these individuals. However, much depends here on the grounds for the refusal 
to undergo enhancement. If such enhancement is clearly safe, and the refusal is no backed by intelligible principled 
reasons, then, while we may still feel sympathy for their plight, it would still be appropriate for us to see them as at 
least partly responsible for it—as we would justifiably regard someone whose prospects have suffered because they 
voluntarily chose not to get educated on frivolous grounds. Indeed, that inequality due to voluntary choice can defeat 
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Sandel might reply that all his argument requires is that the successful believe that the widespread use of 
enhancements makes the ‘unsuccessful’ more responsible for their failures; it does not require that they 
actually are so responsible. But it is hard to see why, in the absence of robust empirical evidence, we 
should expect the ‘successful’ to have this false belief and, as critics have noted, Sandel adduces no such 
evidence.
73
  
However, even if Sandel has succeed in pointing out one way in which biomedical enhancements 
would undermine social solidarity, it should be clear from our discussion that this cannot constitute a 
‘trump card’ against all biomedical enhancements. By ‘trump card’ here, we mean a consideration against 
enhancement that is decisive (that is, not outweighed by countervailing considerations) and whose 
decisiveness is clear in advance of weighing it against countervailing considerations—what Buchanan 
refers to as a ‘conclusive reason’.74 In order for Sandel’s solidarity argument to play that role, it would 
have to be the case that solidarity was of fundamental importance and that Sandel’s argument showed that 
enhancement would, on balance, undermine solidarity. Yet we have argued here that some enhancements 
would promote solidarity by making individuals better citizens who are more tolerant and co-operative 
toward one another. Working out the net impact on solidarity would thus require a comparison of the 
strength of the two mechanisms through which enhancements might influence it.  
 
V. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
So far, we have sought to establish the claim that the use of some biomedical enhancements, 
particularly cognitive enhancements, would lead to the development of increased civic virtue, and that 
this implied that those enhancements had important social benefits. Our primary motivations for making 
this argument have been negative: to further undermine the Personal Goods Assumption, according to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
complaints of unfairness is central to many theories of justice. Moreover, to the extent that refusal to undergo 
enhancement is plausibly seen as a conscious decision not to take one’s civic duties seriously, then this may actually 
ground a complaint against those who make this decision, just as we criticize those who do not vote or who vote 
without taking the trouble to inform themselves about the issues at stake. We thank an anonymous referee for Social 
Theory and Practice for raising this issue. 
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which the benefits of biomedical enhancements will accrue to the individuals who undergo those 
enhancements, and more specifically, to undermine Sandel’s solidarity-based objection to biomedical 
enhancement. We have not sought to establish a positive case for biomedical enhancement and will not do 
so in this final section. But we do wish to briefly indicate how our argument might figure in such a case.  
Defenders of enhancement have typically argued either that it would be morally permissible, 
desirable or obligatory for individuals to biomedically enhance themselves or their children in certain 
ways, or that it would be permissible, desirable or obligatory for the state to allow or encourage the 
engagement in certain kinds of biomedical enhancement.  
At the level of individual morality, our arguments plausibly imply that individuals have an 
additional reason to engage in (or provide to their children) certain biomedical enhancements—namely, 
those that could reasonably be expected to contribute to civic virtue. Perhaps in some cases, these reasons 
will be sufficient to alter the moral status of undertaking such enhancements, for example, from being 
impermissible to permissible, or from being merely permissible to obligatory. In order to draw any more 
concrete moral conclusions from our argument, however, it would be necessary to determine which kinds 
of biomedical enhancements could be expected to enhance civic virtue. We cannot pursue this question 
here, and in any case we suspect that it would be premature to make any firm claims of this sort given that 
the science of enhancement is in its earlier stages, however, as our arguments above indicate, we would 
tentatively suggest that biomedical enhancements which generally augmented learning ability and were 
used in conjunction with basic education would be likely to increase civic virtue.  
At the level of state morality, it is even more difficult to make any firm pronouncements. If, as we 
have been arguing, some enhancements have important social benefits in so far as they promote civic 
virtue, then there will be a prima facie case for the state to allow and perhaps promote or even require the 
use of such enhancements. After all, contribution to civic virtue has often been taken to help justify a role 
for the state in providing and requiring such education. As an economist might put it, if a significant 
portion of the benefits from me biomedically enhancing myself are positive externalities – benefits that go 
to people who are not party to my decision to enhance myself—then I face insufficient incentive to 
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enhance myself (because I might only care about the benefits to me) and I might not enhance, or not 
enhance myself to a sufficient degree. To encourage me to enhance myself more, the state will need to 
lower the cost of enhancement, for example, by subsidising it.  
However, there are at least three considerations that might undermine or defeat this prima facie 
case. First, it might be argued, perhaps on grounds of liberal neutrality, that the state should promote only 
qualities whose status as civic virtues is not (or could not be) reasonably disputed, and, arguably, there are 
no putative civic virtues that satisfy this requirement. Thus, it might be argued, there is no civic virtue 
such that the state should promote the development of that virtue by promoting or requiring enhancement. 
Second, it might be argued that, were a state to require or even promote biomedical enhancements 
it would violate certain rights that it’s citizens hold against it, perhaps including rights to bodily integrity, 
autonomy and rights against coercion and manipulation. It would thus constitute a form of wrongful 
interference and might even be thought to manifest or constitute a lack of civic virtue.  
Third, the state is not a perfect regulator. Thus, even if the state allowed, promoted or required 
only biomedical enhancements that had few downsides and could be expected to greatly augment civic 
virtue, it would inevitably also unintentionally facilitate other biomedical enhancements, perhaps 
including less benign ones. Biomedical enhancements are new and potentially very powerful tools and it 
might be argued that the risk that they will be misused makes it too dangerous for the state to endorse 
even the least problematic uses of them. Of course, there are counterarguments. For example, one could 
argued that, even without state endorsement, biomedical enhancements are likely to be undergone 
covertly by some, and the state would have greater opportunities to prevent their misuse if it allowed its 
citizens freedom to undergo some biomedical enhancements openly.
75
 But the possibility of regulatory 
failure is a factor that needs to be considered and we remain open to the possibility that it defeats the 
prima facie case for state endorsement of biomedical enhancements that can be expected to contribute to 
civic virtue.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper has sought to rebalance the biomedical enhancement debate by identifying an 
important social benefit that biomedical enhancements could have and that has so far been entirely 
overlooked. Specifically, we have argued that biomedical enhancements, for example, of learning ability, 
could contribute to the development of civic virtues in those who use them. We have also argued that 
increased civic virtue is a social good and one that is needed in modern liberal democracies. We have thus 
sought to cast doubt on the assumption that the benefits of biomedical enhancements will accrue only to 
the individuals who use them and on Michael Sandel’s claim that biomedical enhancements should be 
eschewed because they will undermine social solidarity. Finally, we have briefly outlined how our 
argument might figure in a positive case for biomedical enhancements. Here, we noted that individuals 
will plausibly have a defeasible moral reason to engage in (or provide to their children) biomedical 
enhancements that could reasonably be expected to contribute to civic virtue and suggested that these 
enhancements might include learning ability enhancements used in conjunction with basic education. We 
also noted that our argument creates a prima facie case for state endorsement of certain biomedical 
enhancements, though we acknowledged that this case may well be defeated by concerns regarding liberal 
neutrality, individual rights or the misuse of biomedical enhancements.  
 
